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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
9640 
SALA~1:0N JULIAN SANCHEZ, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 22nd day of N ovemhe·r, 1961, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Defendant was convicted of hav-
in fraudulently obtained a narcotic drug in violation of 
Title 58, Chapter 13, Section 35, Utah Code Annotated 
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1953, as .amended, 1961. Defendant prays for reversal on 
the grounds that: (1) The Trial Court committed error 
in refusing defense counsel the right to o bt.ain informa-
tion necessary ~to his defense, and (2) The statute upon 
which Defendant's conviction stands is vague and am-
biguous as applied in this case, and, therefore, void under 
the Due Process Clauses of our State and Federal Con-
stitutions. 
DISPOSITION MADE IN LOWER COURT 
The trial was held on June 16, 1961, before the Hon-
or1ahle Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. A jury was impanelled and the trial proceeded. 
'Tihe State and the defense, having presented their 
cases, were advised by the Court of the proposed jury 
instructions. Counsel for the Defendant excepted to one 
of the proposed instructions and also excepted to the 
Court's refusal to give two of the Defendant's requested 
instructions. 
'Thereupon, counsel for the defense moved for the 
dismissal of the jury and submitted the case for the 
Court's disposition. 
~The Defendant was found guilty as charged in the 
information. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of Trial Court's Judgment. 
STAT'EMEN·T OF FACTS 
A complaint was issued on the 26th of June·, 1961, 
charging the Defendant, SALAMON JULIAN SAN-
CHEZ, with the violation of Title 58, Chaper 13a, Sec-
tion 35, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, by Laws 
of Utah 1955, Chapter 94, as follows: 
"That the· said Salamon Julian Sanchez ... , 
at the time aforesaid, did wilfully and unlawfully 
obtain a narcotic drug, ~to wit: Paregoric, by the 
use of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subter-
fuge." (R-10) 
On October 24, 1961, at 10 :00 o'clock a.m., Defend-
ant appeared with counsel and preliminary hearing was 
held. (R-2) 
Defendant was duly arraigned on November 6, 1961, 
and entered a plea of not guilty. (R-13) 
At trial, the evidence tended to show that the De-
fendant and two others obtained paregoric from the 
Corner Drug Store .at 401 South 9th East. The trio ob-
tained the paregoric after a member of the trio, other 
than the Defendant, persuaded a Dr. Ludlow of Spanish 
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Fork, Utah, to authorize the purchase of the paregoric, 
upon the representation that a sister of one of the trio 
was ill and in need of the paregoric. (R-16, 17). Earlier 
evidence tended to show that in fact, the representations 
made to Dr. Ludlow were false. R-16, 17) 
The State then called upon two witnesses. J\{r. Tros-
per, the pharmacist at the Corner Drug Store, was called 
upon to testify that the paregoric which was sold to the 
Defendant's co-conspirator and the paregoric sample 
admitted into evidence were both taken from the same 
containe~r. (R-20, 21) 
Mr. Elmer Christensen, the State Chernist, was called 
next and testified that he conducted a chemical analysis 
of the paregoric sample which was admitted into evi-
denee. He further testified that he established the 
preS'ence of codeine in the paregoric sample, but that he 
did not determine the percentage of codeine or the num-
ber of grains of codeine per fluid ounce. (R-23) 
The State rested and the Defendant was called upon 
to tes,tify in his o·wn behalf. The defense rested after the 
Defendant was cross-exan1ined. (R-:~3) 
Upon the T'rial Court's refusal to include Defend-
ant's requested instructions nmnbered one and two, and 
upon the Court's insistence of giving instruction nmnber 
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4-A of the Court's ·proposed instructions, defense counsel 
moved to dismiss the jury and the case was submitted to 
the trial judge for detennination. (R-26, 27, 28) 
The Defendant was found guilty as charged and the 
matter was referred to the Adult Probation Board for 
the pre-sentence report. (R-28, 29) 
ST.NTEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMI'TTED ERROR IN DENYING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN INFORMA-
TION NECESSARY TO THE DEFENSE. 
POINT II 
THE STATUE UPON WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S CON-
VICTION STANDS IS VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS AS AP-
PLIED TO THIS CASE, AND THEREFORE, VIOLATES THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
ARGUl\fENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL THE RIGHT 'TO OBTAIN INFORMA-
TION NECESSARY TO THE DEFENSE. 
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The Defendant, in the case at bar, was charged and 
convicted for violating Section 58-13-35, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, as amended 1961. This section of the Uni-
form Narcotic Drug act reads : 
"No pe,rson shall obtain or attempt to ob-
tain a narcotic drug, or procure or attempt to pro--
cure the administration of a narcotic drug, (1) 
by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge, 
or ( 2) by the forgery or alteration of a prescrip-
tion or of any written order, or (3) by the' con-
cealment of a material fact, or ( 4) by the use of 
a false name or the giving of a false address." 
The legislature has stated that the term "narcotic 
drug'' means: 
"Coco leaves, opium, cannabis, and every sub-
stance neither chemically nor physically distin-
guishable from thmn ... "Sec. 58-13-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
Isolated and read separately from the rest of the 
provisions of the Narcotics Drug Act, tlwse two sections 
lead one to believe that the prosecution unquestionably 
<>Htablished a prima facie ease against the Defendant in-
asntuch as the defense counsel stipulated to the facts 
as presented by the State (R-16-19) and the State subse-
quently established by testimony that tl1e paregoric sam-
ple which was introduced into evidenee contained eodeine, 
a derivative of opium, although the quantity of codeine 
per fluid ounce was not established. (R-23) 
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However, if the entire Uniform Narcotic Drug Act 
is read as a whole, and as it should he, we find that the 
legislature did not intend to make this Act applicable 'to 
all narcotic drug tr,affic irrespective of the quantity of 
narcotic in the drug involved. On the contrary, by virtue 
of Section 58-13-17, of our Gode, as amended, by Section 
58-13a-17, the legislature has exempted from the scope 
of the Act, any drugs or medicinal prepa,ration which 
contain less than a specified quantity of narcotics. Sec-
tion 58-13a-17 reads : 
''Except as otherwise in this act specifically 
provided this Act shall not apply to the follow-
ing cases: 
1) Administering, dispensing, or selling at 
retail of any medicinal preparation that contains 
in one fluid ounce, or if a solid or semi-solid prep-
aration, in one avoirdupois ounce, not more than 
one grain of codeine or any of its salts.''' 
At trial, no evidence was presented by the prosecu-
tion which would have established the nareotic content 
in the paregoric which the Defendant allegedly obtained. 
The State Chemist testified that he conducted a chemi-
cal analysis of the paregoric. However, he further testi-
fied that his only purpose in conducting the analysis was 
to determine \Yhether the paregoric contained any co-
deine, not to de,termine the exact quantity of codeine. 
(R.-23) The exeeption of Section 58-13a-17 was not over-
come by proof. 
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Notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove 
away the exception of Section 58-13a-17, the State may 
rely upon Section 58'-13-42 which states : 
"In any complaint, information, or indict-
ment, and in any action or proceeding brought for 
the enforcement of any provision of this Act, it 
shall not be necessary to negative any exception, 
excuse, proviso, or exemption, contained in this 
Act, and the burden of proof of any exemptions, 
proviso, or exemption shall be upon the D,efend-
ant." 
Assuming for tihis case, the validity of Section 58-
13a-42, the Trial Court's error in restricting the informa-
tion demanded by defense counsel by his request for a 
Bill of Particulars is unquestionable. 
The record discloses that defense counsel, at the time 
of arraignment, requested a Bill of Particulars for the 
following questions: 
"1. Does the [sic] 'pal'lagoric' involved in this 
case contain eodeine or any of its salts~" 
"2. If 'the answer to $1 is 'yes,' how many 
grains of codeine or its salts per fluid ounce does 
it contain~" 
"3. Does the [sic] 'paragoric' involved in tllis 
case eontain any other narcotic drug~" 
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"4. Does the [sic] 'paragoric' involved in this 
case contain any other medicinal elements or com-
pounds :in addition to its narcotic drug content~" 
(R-30) 
The :answers which the D,efendant demanded would have 
afforded him the opportunity to carry the burden of 
proving the exemption of Section 58-13a-17, in compliance 
with Section 58-13a-42. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. The State was in possession of the paregoric 
sample. The District Attorney could have determined 
the answers to the questions submitted by Defendant's 
request for a Bill of P 1articulars. 
The legislature has explicitly provided, m circum-
stances such as this, that the Defendant may den1and 
information if the information demanded is necessary 
to his def'f~nse. Section 77-21-9 of our Code reads: 
''1. When an information or indietment 
charges an offense in accordance with the pro--
visions of Section 77-21-8, but fails to inform 
the Defendant of tlhe particulars of the offense, 
sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense, 
or to give him such information as he is entitled 
under the Constitution of this State, the court 
may, of its own motion, and shall at the request 
of the Defendant, order the prosecuting attorney 
to furnish a Bill of Particulars containing such 
information as may be necessary for these pur-
poses ... " 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
This section appears to provide ·the defens·e, as a 
matter of right, information necessary to his defense if 
the circumstances justify the demand. The legislature 
states that the Defendant shall be furnished a Bill of 
Particulars containing such information necessary to his 
defense. In State vs. Solomon, 93 U. 619, 71 P2d 104, 
106, our Supreme Court held: 
"Tthe granting of the Bill of Particulars is not 
discretionary with the court as it was in common-
law, but it is a right which the Defendant can 
demand and which the court must grant if the 
statutory conditions exists.'' 
Certainly, the defense is not entitled to a complete 
disclosure of the prosecution's case, but inasu1uch as the 
Defendant was confronted with the burden of pro:ving 
any and all e:x:emptions and exceptions to the Narcotic 
Drug Act, and inasmuch as the evidence was in the sole 
custody of the prosecution, the defense was entitled to 
information which would have aided him in carrying his 
burden. More specifically, Defendant should have been 
provided with information as to the codeine content per 
fluid ounce in t!he paregoric. Also, it should he noted 
that the use of the Bill of Particulars is not limited to 
incidents wher·e the indictment or information is defec-
tive. On the contrary, the statute specifieally provides for 
the use of the Bill of Particulars even ''when an infor-
Ination or indictment charges an offens·e in accordance 
·with the provisions of Seetion 77-:21-8." Seetion 77-21-
9 U.C.A., 1953. 
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If we assume that the: St'ate has the burden of prov-
ing the entire case including the burden of proving away 
the exceptions, we must further assume that the State 
failed to establish a prima facie case inasmuch as the 
quantity of codeine per fluid ounce of the paregoric in 
question was not established and the exception of Sec-
tion 58-13a-17 was not overcome. 
On the other hand, if, pursuant to Section 58-13a-42, 
the Defendant has the burden of proving the exceptions 
and exemptions of our Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, there 
is no doubt that Defendant should hav·e been provided 
with a complete and responsive bill of particulars so as 
to provide Defendant the opportunity of determining the 
quantity of codeine in the paregoric sample. As an alter-
native to this, the Trial Judge, having denied the De-
fendant the right to obtain the necessary information, 
should have placed upon the prosecution, the burden of 
proving away the exceptions. Unless this is done, a De-
fendant in similar cases would be faced with this dilem-
ma; he would be obliged to assume the burden of proving 
the exceptions and exemptions as provided by statute, 
but he 'Would be unable to do so because of the lirnitations 
placed upon him by the Trial Court's ruling. 
Finally, some questions may arise as to the applica-
bility of the exe1nption under Section 58-13a-17 to this 
case. In Folenius vs. Eckle) 164 NE 2d, 458, 460, 109 Ohio 
App. 132, (1960), the Defendant was charged with hav-
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ing unlawfully obtained a narcotic drug, to wit: Pare-
goric, in violation of the Ohio "LT niform Narcotic Drug 
Aet. Also included in this act is an exemption similar to 
that of Section 58-13a-17 of our Code. The Ohio Revised 
Code, 8ec. 3719.15 reads: 
"The .act shall not apply: 
(a) Where a practitioner administers or dis-
penses; or where a pharmacist or owner of a 
pharmacy sells at retail any medicinal prepara-
ti<on that contains in one fluid ounce, or is a solid 
or s·emi-solid preparation, in one avoirdupois 
ounce: 
(1) not more than two grains of opium, 
(2) not more than one quarter a grain of mor-
phine or any of its salts: 
( 3) not more than one grain of codeine or 
any of its salts.'' 
Upon a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the 
Defendant was released. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in 
ih~ opinion ... dated: 
• 'Pharmacopeia, of which we take judicial 
notie.e, states that in 1000 n1l of paregoric there 
are 40 ml opiun1 tincture. When the formula is 
reduced to grains, it appears that paregoric con-
tains 1.82 grains of opi1un in each fluid ounce. 
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Consequently, paregoric contains less than 2 
grains of opium in each fluid ounce, which bring 
the preparation within the exception of the stat-
ute." 
Also, in People vs. Kal1tnaJ 335 P2d, 246, 168 C.A. 
2d 34, although the court was called upon to resolve a 
somewhat different problem, throughout the opinion, the 
California Court implies that if the ·exemption had be·en 
proved, the Defendant would not have been convicted. 
The same is true in United States vs. Laue,rsJ C.A. 7th 
Cir., 1961) 287 F .2d 633. 
If any distinctions exist between Folenius vs. Eckle 
and the case at bar, it would merely be that in the fonner 
case, the court was concerned with the opium content 
and not the codeine content of paregoric. To digre·ss for 
a moment, if we assume that certain paregoric mixtures 
contain 1.82 grains of opium per fluid ounc.e, and if we 
further assume, as the record discloses, (R-23) that co-
deine is a derivative of opium, is it not highly possible 
that certain paregoric mixtures contain less tihan 1 grain 
of codeine per fluid ounce~ If the paregoric sample in 
question contained less than one grain of codeine per 
fluid ounce, would the case not fall under the exemption 
of Section 58-13a-17 of our Code? Both of these questions 
should unquestionably be answ-ered in the affirmative. 
Our penal statutes should not be construed and em-
ployed in a manner which would r'ender a defense im-
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possible. The Defendant, having had the burden of prov-
ing ,the exemptions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 
in compliance with Section 58-13a-42 of our Code, should 
have been provided with the information demanded by 
his request for a Bill of Particulars. The 'Trial Court, 
having denied this demand, should have placed upon the 
prosecution, the burden of proving away the exemptions 
and ,exceptions. 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the Trial 
Court comn1itted error in denying Defendant informa-
tion necessary to his defense and this cause should, there-
fore, be reversed and remanded for a trial de novo. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTES UPON WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION STANDS. AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, ARE 
UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS AND, THEREFORE, VIO-
LATE 'THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF OUR FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
In the ease at bar, the only n1eans by which the De-
fendant's conviction could be upheld is to assume that 
the- defense, in failing to prove the exemption of Sec.tion 
5R'-13a-l7 of our Code. failed to overcome the evidence 
presented by the State. 
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If we assume that the conviction as it stands, is 
valid, and if we further assume that the facts and e,vi-
dence in this case, are sufficient to uphold the convic-
tion, we are logically compelled to make the ultimrute 
assumption that for this case, Section 58-13a-17 and 77-
21-9 are without force and effect. 
For example, we are involved here with a statute 
which prohibits the fraudulent obtaining of any narcotic 
drugs. Still another provision exempts certain drugs 
which do not eontain the specified amount of narcotics. 
A third provision states that in any trial involving the 
fraudulent obtaining of narcotics, the Defendant is ob-
liged to carry the burden of proving the exemptions. A 
fourth statutory provision provides Defendant with the 
necessary tool by whic:h he may demand from the State, 
information necessary for his defense, to wit: a Bill of 
Particulars. 
The State initiates criminal proceedings upon the 
first statute; the court, pursuant to the third statute 
places the burden of proving the exemptions of the sec-
ond st'atute upon the Defendant. 
In an attempt to comply with the fourth statutory 
provision, the Defendant demands information fron1 the 
State but such demands are, for all intensive purposes, 
denied by the court. 
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If we accept as correct, the premise that the Bill of 
Particulars need not provide the Defendant with evi-
dentiary information, although such information is nec-
essary for the defense, and if the State has possession 
of the only evidence,(R-25), ·w'hat effect does the exemp-
tion of Section 58-13a-17 carry, so far as this Defendant 
is coneerned. Obviously, none. 
In a case involving the interpretation of alien reg-
istration laws, the United States Supreme Court clearly 
indicated that, "a statute though plain and unambiguous 
on its face, may when applied, violate the due process 
law.'' United States vs. Spector, 72 S. Ct. 591, 343 U.S. 
169, 9·6 L. Ed. 863, 865. (See also Dissenting Opinion.) 
Would it not logically follow that statutes, when con-
strued to frustrate the Defendant's legal rights, fall 
within the prohibition against indefinite and ambiguous 
laws1 
A.s early as 1889, the Utah Supreme Court announced 
that due process means every person shall have his day 
in court . .Jensen vs. Union Pac"ific Ra·ilroad Company, 
G U. 253, 21 P. 994, 995. (See also C7u·istensen vs. Harri~ 
109 U. 1, lG3 P2d. 314.) Certainly, this would suggest that 
the ''day in eonrt'' is not rnere]y physieal appearance in 
Court, but is rather a right to appear in Court for the 
purpose of defending- with the opportunity of exercising 
every eonst1tutjonal and statutory right provided him 
by our Federal and State governn1ents. The· right to 
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demand information necessary for the defense would 
seem to be one of such rights. Whether the information 
requested by the defense counsel falls within the termi-
nology of "evidentiary matters" is yet another problem. 
Our Uniform Narcotic Drugs Act exempts from the 
scope of its prohibition, any drug which contains medic-
inal qualities and which contains less than one grain of 
codeine per fluid ounce·. Yet, one might ask, had evidence 
been offered which would have proved that the paregoric 
in evidence fell within the above exemption, would the 
conviction in the instant case still stand~ Judging from 
the disposition made in the Trial Court of this case, it 
appears safe to conclude that the conviction would never-
theless stand. Still, such a judgment could be rendered 
only if we ignore one or more of the pertinent statutory 
provisions involved in this case. 
It is convenient to re-emphasize here that the corn-
plaint of uncertainty is not directed to the wording of 
the statutory provisions as such. The indefiniteness and 
uncertainty of which we complain is such ·as arises from 
the application of the pertinent provisions to the facts 
before the court. 
It should be noted, also, that one of the reasons the 
courts demand clarity and indefiniteness in the wording 
and application of statutes is to make it possible for at-
torneys to advise clients as to the meaning of the statutes 
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and the possible ramifications which may be involved. 
The statutes must he sufficiently clear so as to serve 
as a guide, to courts and counsels alike, in the adjudica-
tion of rights and duties of the individual. Due Process 
Requvrements of Definiteness in Statut~es, 62 Harv. L. 
R,ev. 77, ( 1948). In alluding to the record on appeal, it 
is apparent that neither counsel for the defense nor the 
court were guided by the statutory provisions but were, 
on the contrary, left to speculate as to their meaning and 
application. 
The Defendant respectfully submits the Utah Uni-
form Narcotics Drug Act, as applied in this case, is un-
constitutional for uncertainty and indefiniteness and the 
conviction should, therefore, be reversed and the cause 
rernanded for a trial de nora. 
(]QNCL lTSION 
Defendant, in the case at bar, was clearly denied his 
Rtatutory right under Section 77-21-9, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953; narnely, the right to obtain, by Bill of Par-
ticulars, information necessary for his defense. 
Moreover, the provisions of the Utal1 Uniform N ar-
eotie Drugs Art, as applied to the Defendant's case, w·ere 
uncertain and indefinite, and, thus, violated the Due 
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Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the Federal Constitution and the Section Seven of our 
State Due Process Clause. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the judgment 
should be reversed and cause remanded for a trial de 
novo. 
Respectfully submitted, 
lMITSUNAGA & ROSS and 
KENNETH M. HISATAI(E 
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